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EXECUTIONS AT COMMON LAW.
The procedure by which the successful party in a civil action
is enabled to obtain satisfaftion of his judgment from a recal-
citrant opponent has a long and interesting history. The com-
mon law writs designed for this purpose were formulated at a
period when seigniorial and family claims were slowly yielding
to the demands of commerce; indeed, so far as lands were con-
cerned, they long represented the limits of concession. But their
simplicity of form has stood the test of time, so that while orig-
inal and mesne process has undergone a complete transformation,
final process both in England and the United States bears a close
resemblance to its mediaeval ancestor.
The ancient law differs from the modern in its view of the
conduct of a defaulting debtor and his relation to his property.
Failure to pay is an offense exposing him at the very early law
to private vengeance, to death or slavery. But it is the person
of the debtor and his movables, or personal property, that an-
swer for his debts; lands are not sufficiently his own to be reached
by his creditors, they belong to the family or tribe rather than the
individual-"He who has only immovables is insolvent."'  Much
of the history of final process is summed up in the overthrow
of these ideas.
In its most primitive form execution consisted in the seizure
of the wrongdoer, damage feasant as it were, by his creditor, to
whom his body belongs. Indeed the Roman law of the twelve
tables, harsh as it may seem, was favorable to the debtor, inas-
much as it enabled him to avert or, at least, postpone his fate.
After judgment the debtor was allowed thirty days to satisfy the
claim. If he failed the creditor laid hands on him (manus in-
iectio), and brought him before a magistrate. If he could find
no surety (vindex), his person was adjudged (addictio), to the
1German maxim quoted by Brissaud, History of French Private Law,
American Law School edition, 582. See also 56o and authorities cited.
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plaintiff who could imprison him in his house for sixty days,
during which time the amount of the debt was proclaimed on
three market days. Then if no one redeemed him, the creditor
could sell him as a slave or kill him. If there were several cred-
itors, they could divide him between them and if one cut too
much or too little he was not to be accountable. 2 Fortunately
there was available that other form of self help, distress (pignoris
capio), available to the creditor who preferred property to a
pound of flesh, and long before the Christian era a procedure not
unlike modern bankruptcy was introduced (Missio in possessi-
onem). Execution against the person, however, remained as a
possible remedy in many cases, although rendered uncommon un-
der the Empire by the frequency of cessio bonorum, the voluntary
surrender of the debtor's assets, regulated by a law of Julius
Caesar.3
Early Germanic customs were also severe. The Salic law,
t. 58, required the one who owed weregeld to be presented at
four successive courts, and, if no one paid for him, he paid with
his life. Slavery is the normal fate of the insolvent; in Anglo-
Saxon England will be found the wite-theow, reduced to slavery
because he cannot pay his debts.4 But the church is opposed to
slavery and, indeed, to the landless money lender a hungry slave
would hardly be a profitable investment; before the end of the
Frankish period it seems to be generally admitted that the debtor
is neither to be killed, mutilated or sold.5
An ancient form of self help destined to enjoy a longer his-
tory was private distraint by which the creditor seized the chat-
tels of the debtor as security for payment. The purpose of
distress, however, was to bring compulsion upon the person dis-
trained, who is to be forced thereby to perform his duty.6 The
distrainor may not appropriate the article seized (namium), nor
2 "Tertius, inquit, nundinis partis secanto, Si plus minusve secuerunt, se
(sine) fraude esto." Aulus Gellius, 2o, i; Poste's Gaius (2nd Ed.), 344, 5o6;
Hammond's introduction to Sandar's Justinian, p. 8.
' Caes. Bel. Civ. III, i ; Ferrero II, 236.
4 Stubb's Const. Hist. Eng. i, p. 84.
1 Brissaud, 566.
'Bigelow, Hist. Proc. 202; Bradby on Distress, i.
356 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
may he sell it, he keeps it in his custody as a pledge (vadium),
but not as a satisfaction of the debt. But this method of taking
justice into one's own hands even before the Norman conquest
has come under restrictions intended to prevent violence, and, is
finally subjected to a formal procedure. "No burgess of the
town," says the Ipswich custumal, "may distrain another burgess
of the same town of his own authority for trespass done or debt
due, but must complain to the bailiffs of the town in due form
of law." 7  True, a burgess could for some time longer distrain
his foreign debtor without official sanction, and the landlord or
his bailiff may, in some jurisdictions, still exercise this ancient
privilege upon the goods of the tenant, whose rent is in arrear.
But in general, English law tended strongly toward the repres-
sion of self help by attaching to such action restrictions and
formalities that made it perilous, thus inducing a resort to' the
courts of law." Distress is, however, the normal, and in some
proceedings the only method, by which the early courts may
compel obedience to their writs short of outlawry; the writ of
distringas has had a long and useful career, not yet completely
closed.
If little is said by the early writers on the common law about
final process, it may be for the reason that the really serious
procedural problem of the time was to get a dilatory or contu-
macious party into court at all. Custom forbade that one should
be judged in his absence. The-defendant was summoned and his
essoins, or excuses, allowed with infinite patience from term to
term, for those were days when no one went on a journey with-
out settling his affairs and making his will. But if the default
was inexcusable then the sheriff must endeavor to make him find
sureties and as last resort take possession of his property, im-
pound it, as we would still say, as a means of dompelling obedi-
ence. 9 As for the creditor, he should have taken pledges or sure-
'Ipswich Custumal, c. 42 (1291), Borough Customs, S. S. Vol. 1, p. lOp,
where see also the customs of Newcastle on Tyne and Bury. Compare Paris
Ancienne Coutume, 192, and Bohun's Privilegia Londini (3rd Ed.), 253.
'2 Pollock & Maitland, 572; Maine's Early History of Institutions, 279.
'Mirror, Bk. 4, Ch. 8; 2 Reeve's Hist. Eng. Law, 261. "The law wants
to be exceedingly fair, but is irritated by contumacy. Instead of saying to
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ties in the first instance. In the King's Courts the majority of
cases relate to seisin of land and if judgment is for the demand-
ant it is enforceable by the writ of habere facias seisinam, com-
manding the sheriff to deliver seisin, and except that the similar
writ in ejectment is for possession, there is little to distinguish
Glanville's writ 10 from that in use today. There are also judg-
ments designed to afford specific relief in a manner not unlike that
given later in chancery when damages had become the panacea
of the common law courts." But in most cases, in the earlier
period, the final enforcement of the court's order is by distraint;
such continued to be the practice in detinue ;12 such continued to
be the practice in the local courts, those repositories of ancient
usage, where, in the absence of a special custom to the contrary,
execution was only by distress and impounding.
13
It must not be supposed that because the law moved slowly,
the defendant could defy the court with impunity. Amercements
were unsparingly inflicted by all the courts, royal and seigniorial;
the party in default was amerced, as well as his unfortunate
pledges, every defeated litigant in the royal courts, whether the
action was real or personal was, as a matter of course, "ini miser-
icordia" for his false claim or unjust detention. This in Henry
II's time was no light matter,14 it required an article in Magna
Charta to establish the principle that amercements were to be
"affeered" by the oaths of honest men of the neighborhood '"
the defaulter 'I don't care whether you appear or no,' it sets its will against
his will. 'But you shall appear.' To this we may add that the emergence
and dominance of the semi-criminal action of trespass prevents men from
thinking of our personal actions as mere contests between two private per-
sons. The contumacious defendant has broken the peace, is defying justice
and must be crushed." 2 Pollock & Maitland, 593.
" Compare Glanville, Book 13, Ch. 8, with 2 Annual Practice (1gio),
p. 112.
Glanville, Book 8, Ch. 5; the Court Baron (S. S.) P. 1I5.
123 Blackstone's Commentaries, 413; 2 Annual Practice (I91o). p. 113.
"s22 Lib. Ass. 72; 4 Hen. VI, 17; Tyre v. Burgh, Noy. 17 (16o6); Doe
v. Parmeter, 2 Lev. 81 (1673); Simpson v. Merrill, Carth. 52 (1688) ; Finch,
Bk. 4, Ch. 46; Kitchin on Courts Leet (675), 229. But the writ de execu-
tioni judicii enabled the sheriff and bailiff to sell. Gilbert on Executions
(2nd Ed.), S; Fitzherbert N. B. 20. And see 3 Blackstone's Commentaries,
14; Act of io Geo. III, Ch. 50.
"Dial. de Saac., Bk. 2, Ch. 16.
9 Hen. III, Ch. 14, 1 Stat. at Large, 6.
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and it was long before the customary fines, settled by the honest
men, passed, owing to changes in the value of the currency, from
a petty exaction to a mere phrase in the judgment. Then, when
the writ of trespass comes into use in the reign of Henry III,
the sheriff may be commanded to take the defendant (capias),
for he is charged with a breach of the King's peace vi et armis.
Moreover the mesne process by which the defendant is brought
into court has in view ultimate security for obedience. Bracton
outlined what to his mind at least seemed the orderly process of
compulsion: Summons, two attachments, habeas corpus, three
distraints, the last a seizure by the sheriff of all the lands and
chattels ""in manum domini regis," the officer being answerable
for the profits to the Crown, and, lastly, exaction and outlawry;
but persons so outlawed, Bracton suggests, ought not to lose life
or limb as those outlawed for crimes, but to suffer imprisonment
or abjure the realm. 16
But what was to be done for the plaintiff ? Should he lose the
effect of his suit while the King enjoyed the profits of the fugi-
tive's property? Business would hardly be drawn into the royal
courts on terms that did admit of some advantage to the creditor.
Bracton suggests that it would be right to award to the cred-
itor seisin of the chattels, but on looking at the Note Book it
will be seen that the King's judges are already finding a way out
of the difficulty by directing the sheriff to make the debt out of
the sequestered property and return it to court for the benefit of
the creditor.17  A case of the year 1224 from Worcester will
illustrate the practice."8
" Bracton, f 44o; Finalson's Reeve's Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. 2, p. 261. It
is pointed out by Pollock & Maitland (Vol. 2, p. 591, note) that the habeas
corpus between attachment and distress was not such an arrest as took place
under the subsequent capias by which the sheriff was directed to take and
safely keep the defendant. The habeas corpus, it is suggested, was a pre-
cept to arrest the defendant when court day was approaching in order to
bring him before the court. The statutes of Marlebridge, Ch. 12, and West-
minister I, Ch. 45, cut out the proceedings between first attachment and grand
distress leaving the process as described by Britton, I, 125. The later form
of distringas contained a clause of habeas corpus.
'" Bracton's Note Book, cases 352, 469, 559, 613, 694, 709, 732, 837, 925.
2 Bracton's Note Book, Case goo, Vol. 2, p. 694.
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The Abbot of Gloucester presented himself on the fourth
day 10 against Robert Nel of a plea that he render fifteen marks
which he owes to him and unjustly detains as he says, etc. And
Robert did not come and made several defaults, so that at the
last day it was ordered that the sheriff should distrain him by
lands and chattels, etc., in that he has withdrawn himself, ete.
And the sheriff sent word that he has taken his land and chat-
tels into the hands of our Lord the King, to wit: his corn crop of
this year and five oxen. Therefore by consideration of the
court the sheriff is directed that of the lands and chattels he
make the moneys and have them on the octave of St. Martin to
render, etc.
What the sheriff did and how Robert fared we are not told.
If he must sink into the class of broken men, let him be thankful
that he is not to be escorted through the streets with derisive
horns or condemned, as in France, to wear thereafter the infam-
ous "bonnet vert" of the bankrupt.
2 0
In that golden age of writ making the directions to the sher-
iff will crystalize naturally into common forms. Hence the writ
of levari facias, whereby the sheriff may seize the defendant's
goods and receive the rents and profits of his lands until satis-
faction be made to the plaintiff, a writ that soon falls into dis-
use, except for ecclesiastics, 21 and the writ of fieri facias, the
most familiar and permanent of all writs of execution, by which
the sheriff takes and sells the goods and chattels of the defendant
until he has raised enough to pay the judgment. But the sheriff
is a magnate, or the friend of magnates, who delegates most of
this sordid business to bailiffs and deputies. Perhaps he is un-
willing to proceed against an influential debtor. Already in
Bracton's time a series of writs has been invented to compel him
to perform this unwelcomed duty; and, if he fears to enter the
franchise of a noble, the non omnittas clause will be added and he
" The person summoned had three days of grace beyond the day named
in the writ. 3 Blackstone's Comm. 278. Ancient Germanic custom required
a triple summons, Tacitus, Germ. c. II; Lex Salica, 5o, 2; 74. The venerable
quarto die post is still respected in Pennsylvania, i Tr. & H. Pr. (5th Ed.),
§275.
,Brissaud, §412.
*3 Blackstone's Comm. 418. In Pennsylvania a statutory writ, devised
in 1705 for the sale of mortgaged land, is called a levari facias, but has
little resemblance to the common law writ.
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may then go with sufficient knights and free men of the county.
But he must not disturb the house peace by breaking outer doors,
for the banished Hearth God still protects his neglected
altar.22  If he be minded to keep the goods himself, returning
covinously that they are unsold for want of buyers, the venditioni
exponas issues and sell he must, he cannot even keep the goods
and return the amount of the debt.23  But centuries will pass
before the sale must be at public auction, for the high-sheriff is
not obliged to cry the wares, and, if the parties would have an
auctioneer, they must pay for him.
So far the law has protected real property from seizure or
sale by the judgment creditor. A precocious individualism will,
in time, give to the English property owner greater powers of
disposition, as against his family, than are enjoyed by his con-
tinental neighbor,24 , but the feudal principles of land tenure are
too deeply ingrained to permit landed estates to be regarded as
assets for debts. The lord is not to have a stranger thrust into
the fief against his will.25 As would be expected the first departure
from the old law is by the merchant class in respect to their
burgage tenements. It was not uncommon for debtors to appear
in a court of record, or in chancery, and there acknowledge a
writing obligatory which would be enrolled as a record of the
court, in other words, a recognizance upon which an ordinary
.execution might issue after default.20  In the famous statutes of
Acton Burnell and de Mercatoribus 27 Edward I gave recognition
'Wilda, Strafrecht, 241; Semayne's Case, 5 Co. 91 (i6o5).
'Waller v. Weedale, Noy. IO7 (16o4).
' The custom of retrait lignager, common enough on the continent, Bris-
saud, §221, is rare in England, i P. & M. 632.
"The Jewish money lender could not do homage or fealty, as the privi-
lege of swearing on the Pentateuch was not extended to the ceremony of
investure. Select Pleas of Jewish Exchequer (S. S.) xiii.
'At common law if the conusee did not take out execution within a
year, he was obliged to bring suit. The Statute Westm. I, c. 45, gave a
scire facias. 2 Co. Inst. 468.
II Edw. I and 13 Edw. I, St. 3 (1283-1285), see Jenk's Edward I, I
Select Essays Anglo Amer. Leg. Hist. 14o. The Mirror, Bk. 5, Ch. 7,
attacks the new Statute of Merchants on the ground that imprisonment
except for "torcenous judgment" is a sin. See further the Act of 23 Hen.
VIII, c. 6, providing for recognizances in the nature of statutes staple.
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to the new principles of commercialism by extending the power
to take recognizances to the mayors and city officials, and provid-
ing an expeditious procedure by which the debtor, if he failed to
pay, could be imprisoned and his chattels and "burgage" tene-
ments ,delivered to him to be sold. If the sale was not effected
within a certain time, then all his goods and lands were to be
delivered to the creditor at a reasonable appraisement, or extent,
until out of issues the debt was paid. Somewhat later the Statute
of the Staple 28 conferred similar powers on mayors of staple
towns and provided that on default, body, lands and goods could
be taken under one writ, the extendi facias, and the land deliv-
ered (liberate), at its appraised value. These remedies were
used not only by the merchants for whom they were intended but
by all classes of society until a more flexible procedure and mod-
ern methods of securing commercial credit had rendered them
obsolete. But the extendi facias has American cousins. Land in
New England is "extended" to the creditor at an appraisal. In
Massachusetts final process is, in form, directed against the
goods, lands and person of the debtor.
But burgesses are not alone in seeking credit; the land owner
fs a borrower and the high rate of interest he is charged shows
how slightly the personal liability of the debtor is regarded as se-
curity for payment; the ties of kinship and homage must yield to
the mercantile spirit of the age, and land, to a limited extent at
least, must be subjected to the claims of the judgment creditor. In
1285 29 it is enacted that "when debt is recovered or acknowl-
edged in the King's Court, or damages awarded, it shall be, from
henceforth in the election of him that sueth for such debt or dam-
ages to have a writ of fieri facias unto the sheriff for to levy the
debt of the lands and goods, or that the sheriff shall deliver to
=27 Edw. III, St. 2, Ch. 9; Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium, 131; Bacon's
Abridgment, Executions B. I. By a Statute of 33 Hen. VIII, c. 39, obliga-
tions to the King are to have the same remedy. But the King's name hav-
ing been used in private actions for purposes of fraud, the Statute of 57
Geo. III, c. 17, provided that the extent in aid should not issue unless the
amount due the King was endorsed and if collected was to be paid over to
his majesty's use.
"Statute of Westminster II (13 Edw. I), St. i, Ch. 18, I Stat. of
Realm, 82.
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him all the chattels of the debtor, saving only his oxen and beasts
of his plow, and the one-half of his land, until the debt be levied
upon a reasonable price or extent." It is not improbable that
Parliament, in drafting this statute, borrowed at least some ideas
from the practice of the English Jewry whose legal affairs were
supervised, through the Royal Exchequer, by specially appointed
justices. Early in Edward I's reign it is stated that "According
to the assize and statutes of the King's Jewry, his Jews ought to
have one moiety of the lands, rents and chattels of their Chris-
tian debtors until they shall have received their debts."'30  If the
conjecture is true, then, in a sense, the writ of elegit may be a
mementa of the mediaeval Jewry banished from England in
,290.31
Under the writ of elegit, if the debtor's goods were insuffi-
cient, it was the sheriff's duty to take an inquisition by jury, to
value, or extend, the freehold, 32 lands of the debtor and then
one-half of such lands were to be delivered by metes and bounds
to the creditor 33 until out of the rents and profits, at the yearly
value found, the debt was levied, or the debtor's interest expired.
Upon the entry of the return of the inquisition upon the records
of the court depended the creditor's title as tenant by elegit.34 But
there is this further difficulty; the sheriff delivers merely what
is called legal possession, if actual possession is conceded, well
and good, otherwise the creditor gets merely a right of entry,
that is, a right to bring ejectment to obtain possession 35 in which
action the judgment roll, elegit and inquisition will be evidence of
his title. On the other hand, as an incident to right to have the
3I Maddox History of Exchequer, 247, quoting a roll of 3-4 Edw. I, i
P. & M. 458. See Statutes of Jewry, i Stat. of Realm, 221.
" Select Pleas of Jewish Exchequer (S. S.) xi.
"Copyhold lands were not liable to be taken on elegit until the Act of
I & 2 Vict. C, lio, §II.
"Co. Litt. 289 b., 3 El. Comm. 418, Somery v. Buster, Y. B. Edw. II
(S. S.), 125 (308-09); Den. v. Abington, 2 Dougl. 473 (1780); Fenny v.
Durrant, i B. & Aid. 40 (1817.); Hele v. Bexley, i7 Beav. 14 (1853). The
sheriff must deliver at the value fixed by the inquest. Comyrs v. Brandling,
I Brownlow, 38 (1614).
"Fulwood's Case, 4 Co. 74a (59I).
"Jefferson v. Dawson, 3 Keb. 243 (1673) ; 2 Tidds Pr. (9th Ed.) lO36.
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clegit, the judgment becomes a general lien on the land of the
debtor, which also attaches to land acquired after the judgment,
until the lien expires through failure to execute process, or sat-
isfaction is obtainedY6
The Statute of Westminster II marked the limits of conces-
sion which the landed families were willing to make to the cred-
itor of the freehold tenant. There was little further development
in the law of executions against property. The fieri facias did
not reach choses in action 37 and the creditor was compelled to
go to chancery or the legislature for relief. By the Statute of
Frauds " the interest of a cestui que trust in lands was made
liable to execution, but the statute was narrowly construed.39
Only in the nineteenth century and then with great caution did
the English Parliament adopt a new policy toward the alienation
of land for debts. An act of 1838 40 extended the writ of elegit
to the whole of the debtor's land, and the Judgment Act of
1864 41 provided that where land had actually been delivered to
a creditor under an elegit, he might apply to the Chancery Divi-
sion of the High Court for an order for a sale of his debtor's
interest in the land. But while executions against property were
thus restricted, a series of acts extended the capias ad respon-
dendum over the field of contract, 42 and, since "where capias lies
11Y. B. 30 Edw. III, 24; Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea, i P. Wins. 277
(1715) ; Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough, 2 P. Wins. 491 (i8o8); Conrad v.
Ins. Co., i Peters, 386 (U. S. 1828), Sudgen on Vendors (8th Amer. Ed.),
Vol. 2, p. 156. Most American courts follow the common law rule, but there
are exceptions. In some States where judgments are not a lien the same
result is attained by attachment on mesne process.
"' Co. Litt. 29o b., Francis v. Nash, Temp. Hardw. 55 (1755); Denton v.
Livingston, g Johns. 96 (N. Y. 1812); Freeman on Executions (3rd Ed.),
§I12.
2329 Charles II, Ch. 3, §IO.
"King v. Ballett, 2 Vern. 248 (1691); Doe v. Greenhill, 4 B. & Ald. 690
(1821). As the statute did not extend to the provinces, the American law
on this subject varies greatly.
" Act of I & 2 Vict., Ch. i1O, §Im. Goods are excluded from the writ
by the Bankruptcy Act of 1883, §146.
41 27 & 28 Vict., Ch. 112, §4. In re Duke of Newcastle, L. R. 8 Eq. 7oo
(I869); In re Harrison, L. R. (1899), I Ch. D. 465.
42 By the Statutes of Marlebridge (52 Hen. III), c. 23, and Westminster
11 (13 Edw. I), c. ii in account; by 25 Edw. III, c. 17 in debt and detinue; by
ig Hen. VII, c. 9 in all actions on the case. See Hale's discourse on the
King's Bench, Hargreave's Law Tracts, 359.
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in process, there after judgment, capias ad satisfaciendurn
lies," 48 imprisonment for debt gained a new lease of life with
all its horrible and grotesque incidents, so familiar in the pages
of Dickens, until in the nineteenth century it was suppressed,
or almost suppressed, for the capias still exists in an attenuated
form, and, sharp practitioners have also found it possible to
collect debts by committals for contempt in proceedings supple-
mental to execution.
How much of the common and statute law of England the
colonists brought with them to North America is a matter of
doubt and dispute which time has only further obscured.44  At
the least, they were welcome to make use of so much of the
ancient and ponderous machinery as was suited to their needs.
Debts did not disappear in the Western Utopia, so fieri facias,
capias and elegit crossed the Atlantic in pursuit of the improvi-
dent. Of these writs the first two still flourish, frequently, it
is true, in a code disguise. But although there are scattered in-
stances of its early use, and although aristocratic Virginia 45
kept it long, the elegit was too feeble a remedy to survive. The
colonists, as is usually the case in new communities, needed cap-
ital for the development of their country and land was their prin-
cipal asset; the merchants of Great Britain trading with the plan-
tations complained of the difficulties they encountered in prov-
ing, recovering and levying debts due them. Accordingly, in 1732
it was enacted by Parliament that "the houses, lands, negroes,
and other hereditaments and real estates" within the plantations
in America should be chargeabe with all just debts and demands
owing to his Majesty or any of his subjects and should be sub-
ject to like remedies for seizing, extending, selling and disposing
of the same towards the satisfaction of such debts as personal
'Harbert's Case, 3 Co. 1i b. (1584); Y. B. 43 Edw. III i; Y. B. 2
Hen. IV, 6; Ognell v. Paston, 2 Leon. 84 (1586); Kintzel v. 6 lsen, 73 Atl.
Rep. 962 (N. J. igog).
"English Common Law in American Colonies, by P. S. Reinsch; Ex-
tension of English Statutes to the Plantations, by S. L. Sioussat, Select
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. 1, p. 367, 416.
0I Rev. Code. Va. (18ig), Ch. 134, where the earlier acts are referred
to. See also Barbour v. Breckenridge, 4 Bibb. 548 (Ky. 18ig).
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estate.46 In the words of Chancellor Bland, who has luminously
discussed this subject: "It followed as a necessary consequence,
that upon a judgment against the debtor himself his lands might
be taken and sold by a fieri facia,, and in order that the writ itself
should express this new extension of the authority it gave, the
words 'lands and tenements' were inserted so as expressly to
command the levy to be made 'of the goods and chattels, lands
and tenements' of the defendant.14 7  The same learned jurist
adds, that while the statute speaks only of "debts, duties and
demands," it was always construed to extend to all cases where
the plaintiff recovered a judgment for a sum of money, and
thereby became a creditor of the defendant, although the founda-
tion of the claim was not a pecuniary claim but a mere trespass
or personal injury.
But while the Statute of George II provided for the sale of
real estate on execution throughout all the colonies it did not
originate this practice. In Massachusetts, the provincial act of
1696 enacted that all the lands and tenements of the debtor should
stand charged with the payment of his just debts and should be
liable to be taken in execution for the satisfaction of the same,
4 8
and in 1701 the General Court adopted a writ of execution
against the goods, lands and person of the debtor that has never
been substantially departed from.40  According to the practice,
as settled by the acts of 1716 and 1719,50 which, with some vari-
ations, is followed in other New England" States, the land levied
on is viewed and valued by three appraisers and a sufficient quan-
tity set off by metes and bounds to satisfy the execution. The
debtor may redeem within one year after the levy by paying
'5 George II, Gh. 7, §4.
"Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland, 284 (Md. 1831). See further Jones v.
Jones, i Bland, 443 (Md. 1827); Bank of Utica v. Merserean, 3 Barb. 528
(N. Y. 1848). Virginia is said to have rejected this section of the statute
as an encroachment upon her sovereign rights. Coombs v. Jordan, supra.
"5 Dane's Abridgment, 23. A still earlier act of 1647 authorized the
attachment of lands. Laws of Massachusetts Colony (I672), p. 7.
"Act of May 28, 1701; Laws of the Province of Massachusetts Bay
(742), p. 139; Hoar v. Tilden, 178 Mass. 157 (9o).
' Gordon v. Lewis, I Sumn. 529 (U. S. C. C. 1834), Rev. L. Mass. (io2),
Ch. 178.
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the debt with interest, as well as expenses and repairs, receiving
credit for the rents and profits.
In Pennsylvania, at the first assembly held at Chester, De-
cember 7, I682, it was enacted that lands should be liable for
debts except when there was legal issue and then all the goods
and one-half of the land only.51 But the statute that is the true
basis of the Pennsylvania practice is that of January 12, I7O5-6,52
which provided that where land was levied on, if a sheriff's in-
quest found that the clear profits would in seven years satisfy
the debt, the land was to be delivered to the creditor until the
debt was satisfied, but if the inquest found that the profits would
be insufficient for such purpose, then the land should be sold on
a writ of venditioni exponas. Subsequent legislation has not ma-
terially altered this procedure 53 although it is customary to-day
to hold the inquest in a somewhat perfunctory manner and to
condemn the land, if counsel so direct.
The legislation in each State has its own history and peculi-
arities but there are certain general tendencies that may be briefly
noted. 54 CA requirement prevalent in most of the States is that
the creditor resort in the first instance to the personal property
of the debtor and look to the real estate only where the person-
alty is insufficient) But in Illinois 55 personal property shall be
last taken, a rule reminiscent of the pioneer days when the prairie
was more easily acquired than the plough. In many States, in
imitation of the early New England practice, the debtor is al-
lowed a period for redemption, the purchaser in the meanwhile
receiving a certificate of sale and only receiving a sheriff's deed
' Charter Laws of Province of Pennsylvania, 12o. There was a similar
provision in Penn's laws agreed upon in England "except that the liability
of land in case of issue was limited to one-third." Id. oo. An explanatory
act of 1688 provided for a suspension of execution for one year after judg-
ment as to the plantation on which the debtor was chiefly seated, and this
was incorporated in the Act of Nov. 27, 1700, 2 Pa. Stat. at Large, 53.
522 Pa. Stat. at Large, 244.
32 Pepper & Lewis's Digest (2nd Ed.), 3453, et seq. The inquest, orig-
inally twelve men is by an Act of May IO, 1881, P. L. 13, reduced to six.
" 4 Kent's Commentaries, *429; Washburn on Real Property, *462, edi-
tions prior to the fifth.
"4 Ill. Stat. Ann. 6757; Pitts v. Magie, 24 Ill. 61o (186o).
EXECUTION AT COMMON LAW
when the period has expired and the title has become absolute.
The exemption of specific articles from levy and sale, unknown
to ,the common law, is universal, but the statutes vary in liber-
ality. In some of the agricultural communities homestead ex-
emptions frequently amount to immunity from execution, a re-
version to family right.
As to the conduct of the sale, that is a matter in which the
sheriff and his bondsmen are chiefly concerned; he acts or re-
frains from action according as he is indemnified or sued; in
other respects the essentials are a flag, a bell, a seasoned bailiff
and a bidder bold enough to buy a lawsuit, for the doctrine of
caveat emptor is literally applied. While receiver's sales and
bankruptcy sales are conducted under decrees framed to meet the
exigencies of the particular case, nowhere has there been any
real effort made to work out the problems connected with sales
on execution with a view toward assuring an unimpeachable title
to the purchaser, and thereby preventing the needless sacrifice of
property.
There are few titles or interests today.that cannot be applied,
in some manner, to the claims of creditors, but the procedure by
which this is accomplished is too often dilatory and imperfect.
The problems connected with final process have not received the
same attention as those connected with the earlier stages of an ac-
tion, for the excellent reason that external criticism has been
mainly directed to the law's delays before judgment, on the
assumption that the defendant, if he loses, Will pay; if not, it
will be at best a game of hide and seek. In England the reforms
based on the. Judicature Act of 1873 have not touched the ancient
writs of execution.56 In the United States the statutory writs
based on the ancient writs have in many jurisdictions inherited
mediaeval limitations and technicalities, and, where the early
legislation has been supplemented by special enactments designed
to meet particular difficulties, such for example as those arising
out of the nature of choses in action, the result is a patchwork
system with equity as a last resort. There is no practical reason
' Rules of the Supreme Court, Order xliii, rule i. A judgment no longer
operates as a charge on land unless a writ or order "for the purpose of enforc-
ing it" is registered in the land registry office. Act 63 & 64 Vict. (igoo), Ch. 26.
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for more than one form of final process; there is no good reason
why all the rights of parties and claimants, legal and equitable,
should not be worked out under the direction of the court, in the
execution of such process, and there is no inherent reason why
a title acquired at sheriff's sale should be of all titles perhaps one
of the most doubtful.
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